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Abstract - Malware is become an epidemic in computer net-
work nowadays. Malware attacks are a significant threat to 
networks. A conducted survey shows malware attacks may 
result a huge financial impact. This scenario has become 
worse when users are migrating to a new environment which 
is Internet Protocol Version 6. In this paper, a real Nimda 
worm was released on to further understand the worm beha-
vior in real network traffic. A controlled environment of both 
IPv4 and IPv6 network were deployed as a testbed for this 
study. The result between these two scenarios will be analyzed 
and discussed further in term of the worm behavior. The ex-
periment result shows that even IPv4 malware still can infect 
the IPv6 network environment without any modification. New 
detection techniques need to be proposed to remedy this prob-
lem swiftly.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
IPv6 is a new network protocols which is meant to over-
come IPv4 problems. Many advantages offered by this new 
protocol including 1) A large number of address flexible 
addressing scheme 2) Offers packet forwarding more effi-
cient 3) Support for secure communication 4) Better sup-
port for mobility and many more [1]. Although IPv6 offers 
a lot of benefits, people are still reluctant to totally migrate 
from IPv4 to IPv6 network. This is because even IPv6 have 
been deployed for many years, this protocol is still consi-
dered in its infancy [2]. Many researchers have spent ample 
of time to enhance the IPv6 services to become at least at 
par with IPv4 addresses. Since IPv4 addresses are facing 
depletion, migrating to IPv6 is inevitable eventually [3-5]. 
Some studies claimed that IPv6 cause many security issues 
[6-9]. Unfortunately, researchers pay little attention on 
IPv6 security issues[10]. Thus, some culprits are really 
eager to fully utilities all the vulnerabilities occur during 
this transition period. Producing malware is one of the most 
popular techniques to be used. Studies show that new age 
malwares can survive in new network environment [11, 
12]. Hence, researchers agree that further studies have to be 
conducted to remedy the malware infection issues [13-16]. 
 
Malware is software which rapidly invented to manipu-
late vulnerabilities of computer networks. Based on [17], 
250 new malware variants were introduced everyday from 
all over the world. These so called new age malwares were 
not new genuine ones but rather innovated from the exist-
ing malware. These malwares were modified and some 
modules were added to it to avoid being detected from the 
anti-virus software which is using signature patterns to 
detect malwares.  
 
Malware is become an epidemic in computer network 
nowadays[18]. Malware attacks are a significant threat to 
networks. A conducted survey shows malware attacks may 
result a huge financial impact[19]. This scenario is becom-
ing worse when users are migrating to a new environment 
which is Internet Protocol Version 6. 
 
The objectives of this study are to determine whether an 
IPv6 network is totally safe from attacks which were in-
tended for IPv4 network and to identify malware behavior 
in different network environments.  
 
In the following chapters, we will explain about some re-
lated works to this study and followed by the methodology 
used in this experimental research. The experimental design 
will be explained and some result and analysis will be dis-
cussed. Finally, the conclusion for the overall study will be 
stated in the end of this paper. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Malware 
Malware are represented by several forms namely vi-
rus, Trojan, spyware, adware and worms [20, 21]. Each of 
them has different characteristics to attack their victims. 
Their method of propagation also varied including sharing 
memory sticks, downloading files, peer-to-peer applica-
tions, sharing file and many more.  
 
B. Malware Propagation Methods 
Many activities can help these malware propagate more 
easily. Unfortunately, most of end-users are not fully aware 
of it due to lack of knowledge about this issue. We have 
classified this propagation in two categories namely 1) hu-
man intervention and 2) self-propagation. 
Most of malware are spreading involving human inter-
vention. These activities including transferring virus via 
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memory sticks, installing peer-to-peer applications, down-
loading files which contain malware and send-
ing/forwarding malware emails. Malwares fall in this cate-
gory are virus, Trojan, spyware and adware. Since its prop-
agation based on human intervention, the spreading rate 
cannot be determined cause the key value of spreading the 
virus is very subjective. If those malware transferred rapid-
ly by victims, then the spreading rate is very high. Howev-
er, if it just left without any execution in the computer, the 
malware will stay dormant and the spreading rate will be 
low.  
 
The other propagation category is self-propagation. The 
only malware falls in this category is worm. This is because 
the spreading method has been pre-defined and hardcoded 
in the worm software so that it can launch the attack by 
itself without needed any intervention by human. Worms 
normally will scan for victims before it initiate the first 
attack. Therefore, this worm spreading can be determined 
technically. However, it is not easy to determine it because 
each of them is using different scanning method to search 
for their victims.  
 
C. Malware Scanning Methods 
The worm scanning methods can be divided into three 
categories as defined by [22] 1) naïve random scanning, 2) 
sequential scanning and 3) localized scanning. The first 
scanning method already defined the target regardless the 
information about the victim’s network. The example worm 
which is using this technique is Slammer. The second scan-
ning method will search for vulnerable hosts through their 
closeness in IP address space based on host configuration. 
Blaster worm is an example uses this technique to attack its 
victim. Finally, the last scanning method preferentially 
searches for vulnerable hosts in the local subnetwork. It 
uses the victim’s network information to initiate the attack. 
Nimda worm is an example uses this technique to attack its 
victim.  
 
We believe the localized scanning method is very dan-
gerous since its will use the information about the current 
network to launch its attack and the result will be disastr-
ous. What is more, this worm can survive in a new network 
environment for example in IPv6 network environment. 
This paper has used Nimda variant E to be released in both 
IPv4 and IPv6 network environment to see how this worm 
works and how it will affect the network performance. 
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
In this study, we have planned some work flow in order 
to get our expected result. The methodology used for this 
study as depicted in the Figure 1. 
In order to test the IPv4 worm behavior in both IPv4 and 
IPv6 network environment two testbeds have been imple-
mented. The computer setup and configuration are identical 
except for the protocol used to communicate between com-
puters are different. The testbed design for this study can be 
found in Figure 2. 
 
Before the worm released, a clean testbed need to be 
ready. Some worms will remain in the memory even after 
the virus was cleaned by the antivirus software. Therefore, 
each computer will be cleaned thoroughly including format 
all computers involve to ensure no other factors will affect 
the result later on. The original configuration for comput-
ers, router and switch involve will be restored. 
 
After the clean testbed ready, the packet sniffer node 
will be activated to capture all packets through the gateway 
router. The reason the gateway router involves in this expe-
riment is because to simulate as if this environment is ac-
cessible to the other networks. Therefore, this will stimulate 
the worm to launch its attack to broader scale rather than 
local area network only.  
 
 
Figure 1: Research Methodology 
 
Since worm in IPv6 is still new, we are expecting two 
different results will occur based on the worm behavior. 
The first one, the worm will survive in IPv6 network envi-
ronment and attack IPv6 nodes directly. If this is the case, 
then the attack pattern can easily be determined based on 
changes happened in the affected nodes. However, if the 
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worm is not affecting the IPv6 then we will see whether the 
worm probably affect the network bandwidth. Then, if the 
worm is consuming the bandwidth consumption, the ano-
maly pattern needs to be determined later on. Otherwise, 
the worm can be considered totally dormant in IPv6 net-
work. 
 
IV. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
In this experiment, we used the network layout as depict 
in Figure 2: 
 
Gateway Router
Fa0/1
Fa0/0
Fa0/2
Fa0/3
Fa0/5
PC1
PC2 PC3
Network Add:
1st Sc: 10.1.1.0/24
2nd Sc: 2001:1:1:1::0/64
Trunk Port mirror
 
Figure 2: Testbed Network Layout 
 
Based on Figure 2, three computers had been setup in 
this testbed namely PC1, PC2 and PC3. PC1 was installed a 
packet sniffer software to capture all traffic through the 
gateway router trunk. PC2 and PC3 work as nodes in the 
same network where PC2 as the source who release the 
worm. These computers used Windows XP SP1 as their 
operating system and Nimda variant E will be used as the 
worm in the experiment.  
 
The procedure of this experiment is as the following: 
 
S1: Ready all computers, router and switch. Restore all 
default configurations into those computers, router and 
switch. 
S2: Activate the packet capture software on PC1 to start 
capture the ideal network pattern. 
S3: Leave the computers for a few minutes to ensure the 
network traffic has become stable.  
S4: Start releases the Nimda.E worm from PC2. 
S5: Wait for a few seconds until we can saw the worm 
started infected the network. 
S6: Leave the computer for a few minutes to ensure the 
worm fully infected the network. 
S7: Plug out all cables connected to computer to stop the 
simulation and save the network traffic log from PC1 for 
further analysis. 
S8: Before starts the next experiment session, all computers 
must be formatted to ensure it is free from worm infection 
in operating system and in its memory. 
 
V. RESULT & ANALYSIS 
A. The First Scenario 
In this scenario, IPv4 network protocol will be used. 
The network address used for this scenario is 10.1.1.0/24. 
Before the worm was released, the ideal network traffic 
pattern was captured as a benchmark. Figure 3 shows the 
benchmark of an ideal network traffic pattern. 
 
 
Figure 3: Ideal Network Traffic Pattern for IPv4 network 
 
Figure 3 shows the graph about number of packets cap-
tured through the gateway router in seconds. For an ideal 
network, the traffic through the gateway router interface is 
less than 3 packets per second as depict in Figure 3. These 
packets were released for the network information conver-
gence. 
 
After the network stable, the worm was released in the 
network. After the worm was released, the number of pack-
et received by the gateway router was increased exponen-
tially as depicted in Figure 4. The sample of the captured 
packet is depicted in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 4: Network Traffic pattern after Nimda.E worm re-
leased in IPv4 network 
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Figure 5: Packet captured after Nimda.E worm released in 
IPv4 network 
 
Figure 4 shows the graph about number of packets cap-
tured through the gateway router in seconds. After the 
worm was released, it shows that the number of packets 
through the gateway router was dramatically increased up 
to almost 55 packets per seconds as depicted in Figure 4. 
Meanwhile, Figure 5 show the sample of packets captured 
after the worm was released. It seems that the worm re-
leased TCP flooding those packets were generated by one 
IP address which it is belong to the infected computer 
based on the IP address. We conclude after a computer was 
infected by Nimda.E worm, it will release a massive num-
ber of TCP connections to connect to its potential victims 
based on the network address information from the infected 
computer.  
B. The Second Scenario 
In this scenario the network layout and the computers 
setup were identical with the previous scenario. The only 
different in this scenario was the computers were using 
IPv6 network protocol instead of IPv4. The network ad-
dress for this scenario is 2001:1:1:1::0/64. Same as in pre-
vious scenario, the ideal network traffic pattern was cap-
tured as a benchmark in it is depicted in Figure 6: 
 
 
Figure 6: Ideal Network Traffic Pattern for IPv6 network 
 
Figure 6 shows the graph about the number of packet 
through the gateway router in seconds. Same as in previous 
scenario, in an ideal network the traffic through the gate-
way router is less than 3 packets per seconds which were 
used for the network information convergence.  
After the network stable, the worm was released in the 
network. After the worm was released, the number of pack-
et received by the gateway router was increased exponen-
tially as depicted in Figure 7. The sample of the captured 
packet is depicted in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 7: Network Traffic pattern after Nimda.E worm re-
leased in IPv6 network 
 
 
Figure 8: Packet captured after Nimda.E worm released in 
IPv6 network 
 
Figure 7 shows the graph about number of packets cap-
tured through the gateway router in seconds. After the 
worm was released, the number of packets through the ga-
teway router way severely increased to almost 55 packets 
per seconds as shown in Figure 7. Figure 8 shows the sam-
ple of packets captured after the worm was released. If in 
IPv4, the worm released the TCP flooding but in IPv6 it 
released ARP flooding instead. We believe this is because 
the worm was trying to attack its victim in IPv4 network 
even the worm was released in IPv6 network environment. 
We realized the infected computer is not using  
 
C. The Experiment Result Analysis 
After all the experiments done, we gathered all the in-
formation for further analysis. Figure 9 shows the compari-
son between numbers of packet released based on different 
scenarios. 
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Figure 9: The average packet released based on different 
scenarios 
Figure 9 shows the comparison of numbers of packets 
released based on three different scenarios. The first line is 
about the average number of packets released in second 
after the worm infected in IPv4 network. The second line is 
about the average number of packets released in second 
after the worm infected in IPv6 network. The last line is 
about the average number of packets released on an ideal 
network. Since the number of packet released in ideal net-
work are identical between IPv4 and IPv6 network, then 
this information is represented by one scenario only. 
 
From the Figure 9, we can see that the numbers of pack-
ets are exponentially increased after the worm was released 
compares to an ideal network regardless the network proto-
col used whether it is in IPv4 or IPv6 protocol. However, 
the number of packets released in IPv4 is slightly higher 
compares in IPv6 and the type of packets released in each 
network are also different. This is probably because the 
router need more time to process the address information in 
IPv6 due to its long ip addressing scheme. Moreover, the 
type of packet released was also different in IPv4 compares 
to IPv6 where in IPv4 the worm was released TCP connec-
tions to its victim whereby in IPv6 the worm was released 
ARP packet to connect to its victim as depicted in Figure 5 
and Figure 8. The comparison is compiled in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Comparison Between Different Scenarios 
 Ideal 
Network 
Infected 
IPv4 Net 
Infected 
IPv6 Net 
Maximum number 
of packets released 
(per sec) 
3 55 55 
Average packet 
released per second 
Low Slightly 
Higher 
High 
Type of packet Network 
Discovery 
ND & 
TCP 
ND & 
ARP 
(ND) 
Type of attack None TCP 
Flooding 
ARP 
Flooding 
 
D. The Experiment Findings 
After two different scenarios executed and analyzed, 
we compiled our conclusions for this study as the follow-
ing: 
 Even IPv6 node infected, it still look for its victim 
in IPv4 network. This shows that IPv4 malware still can 
survive in IPv6 network environment without any modifi-
cation made on the existing worm. 
 In IPv4 network, the nimda worm will release 
TCP flooding attacks whereas in IPv6 network, the worm 
will behave differently by releasing ARP flooding attacks. 
 IPv4 worm will not directly infect the IPv6 nodes, 
but it will totally consume the IPv6 network. IPv6 seem not 
totally invincible from attack even the attack was intended 
for IPv4 network. This scenario will become worse if the 
network is using transition mechanism to communicate 
between IPv4 and IPv6 network protocol. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Migrating from IPv4 to IPv6 is inevitable. Many re-
searchers put a lot of effort to ensure the IPv6 services and 
stability to be much better compares to IPv4. However, not 
many researchers pay enough attention on security issues. 
The malware give severe impact on the network which 
cause a lot of trouble to end users. This paper shows that 
malware which was invented for IPv4 network still can 
penetrate and survive in IPv6 network without any modifi-
cation made on the existing malware. This issue will be 
worse if the organization is using transition mechanism to 
communicate both their IPv4 and IPv6 nodes.  
 
For further research, a more realistic testbed need to be 
used to represent the real network environment. A study on 
how this worm behaves in transition mechanism such as 
dual-stack need to be conducted to further understand how 
it works. Finally, a new detection technique needs to be 
proposed to cater this issue. 
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